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Abstract
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), passed in 2009, provided funds
to help the American economy recover from the 2008 economic crisis. More than $7
billion was designated to the advancement of broadband services, and critically,
improvement in broadband infrastructure and adoption in underserved areas. This
thesis sought to discover if there is a significant causal relationship between the amount
of ARRA funding given to a U.S. state and its increase of broadband
availability/adoption rates between 2010 (when all ARRA projects were announced),
2013, and 2016 (after all projects were completed). After running various regressions, I
found that there is no such relationship between a state’s logarithmic level of ARRA
funding and percent increases in either availability or adoption rates. In fact, only one
regression displayed any significant causal relationship at all: a negative relationship
between funding received and a state’s 2016 adoption rate. The results, explained
below, contain lessons for policymakers going forward as society’s dependence on
high-speed internet continues to increase.
Keywords: broadband, ARRA, infrastructure, economic development
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The Effects of ARRA Funding on Broadband Availability and Adoption
The aftermath of 2008’s “Great Recession” revealed an array of critical
weaknesses in the American economy. After the collapse of the financial markets with
Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy and the rupture of the housing bubble, legislators rushed
to create a stimulus that would both kickstart the failing economy and address the
vulnerabilities uncovered by the crisis. Recognizing the socioeconomic divides and
deteriorating infrastructure that contributed to the historic recession, lawmakers passed
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act in early 2009 with the objective of
“making supplemental appropriations for job preservation and creation, infrastructure
investment, energy efficiency and science, assistance to the unemployed, and state and
local fiscal stabilization” (American Recovery and Reinvestment Act [ARRA], 2009, p.
1).
One vulnerability that received attention from ARRA was broadband
accessibility/adoption, particularly in unserved and underserved areas. ARRA directed
$7.465 billion of funding toward three major agencies to accomplish its broadband
infrastructure goals (Kruger, 2015). First, to tackle ARRA’s emphasis on transparency,
the act funneled $293 million to State Broadband Initiative (SBI) grants, allocated
toward collecting, maintaining, and providing broadband data, alongside creating a
publicly-accessible broadband map. Second, the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA) – overseen by the U.S. Department of Commerce
(DOC) – received $3.936 billion for their Broadband Technology Opportunity Program
(BTOP) to lay broadband infrastructure and encourage sustainable adoption of
broadband services. Most of the BTOP funding – $3.46 billion – was allocated toward
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infrastructure (88%), with small percentages going toward public computer centers (5%)
and sustainable broadband adoption programs (5%). Third, with an aim to address the
particularly underserved rural areas of the U.S., the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s
(USDA) Rural Utilities Service (RUS) received $3.529 billion for broadband projects that
impacted areas of at least 75% rural classification. Grants and loans allocated to RUS
were managed through the Broadband Initiatives Program (BIP). Whereas the majority
of BTOP’s projects were “middle mile” projects – projects that process/enhance Internet
services rather than cater to end users like firms and households – most BIP projects
were “last mile”, or accessible to the end user (Kruger, 2015).
One may question the true definition of broadband adoption, a valid concern
given the vast number of changes that definition has undergone in recent years. One
component of the definition is the infrastructure itself. The Federal Communication
Commission (FCC) outlines six formats for broadband infrastructure – (1) digital
subscriber line (DSL), (2) cable modem, (3) fiber optic cable, (4) wireless (i.e. Wi-Fi), (5)
satellite, and (6) broadband over powerline (BPL) – with fiber optic cable having the
fastest download/upload speeds (Federal Communication Commission [FCC], 2014).
The type of infrastructure receiving investment is an important contributor to broadband
adoption rates (see Prieger, 2015), and therefore, it is prudent to mention that the
aforementioned infrastructure formats are included in our definition of broadband, but
mobile telephone services (i.e. 3G, LTE) are not, as they did not receive outright funding
from ARRA. As such, I do not measure mobile telephone adoption in this paper’s
analysis.
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Perhaps more integral to broadband’s definition, however, is the speed at which
the end-user (i.e. the “last mile”) can download/upload data, measured in bits-persecond (bps). In the FCC’s First Broadband Deployment Report published in 1999, the
benchmark definition of broadband – the benchmark which the ARRA first aimed to
meet – was 200 kbps for both downloads and uploads. While an adequate benchmark
at the time of its inception, the 200 kbps download/200 kbps upload benchmark soon
became unreliable as the Internet transformed from almost entirely text-based websites
to a network of complex, image-/video-embedded sites. In 2010, shortly after the
passing of ARRA, the FCC published its Sixth Broadband Deployment Report, where
the benchmark was raised to 4 Mbps download/1 Mbps upload. And now, the
complexity of the Internet and its intended uses have again eclipsed the viability of the
2010 benchmark; with the popularization of video-based social media platforms such as
Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter, the benchmark for the FCC’s broadband adoption
metrics have increased to its current state of 25 Mbps/3 Mbps. This benchmark was
established in the FCC’s 2015 Broadband Progress Report, announced before all
ARRA projects were to be completed. In this paper, I will use the current 25 Mbps/3
Mbps benchmark as the standard for comparing broadband adoption between years, as
it demonstrates if ARRA funding had a sustainable impact on broadband adoption.
As the world becomes increasingly interconnected, reliable broadband access is
now critical to economic growth. And now, over a year into the COVID-19 pandemic and
trudging through another world-changing recession, our communication infrastructure is
experiencing unprecedented pressure to perform. Thus, it is timely to examine the
success of ARRA to determine if large-scale national broadband funding has
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realistically led to significant increases in broadband availability and adoption, and if
those outcomes still meet the relevant benchmark set by the FCC today.
Historically, analyses of ARRA and broadband adoption have either focused on
specific subsections of the act – for example, BTOP’s impact on adoption – or analyzed
the more general topic of state aid on broadband adoption (Hauge & Prieger, 2015;
Whitacre & Gallardo, 2020). Few researchers have specifically revisited ARRA using
data after all ARRA projects were to be completed, which was in 2015. Therefore, this
research will add valuable insight to the literature, as it reinvestigates the holistic
success of ARRA using data following the 2015 project deadline imposed on award
grantees. In Section II, I will review relevant literature regarding this topic. This will be
followed by a brief overview of the data in Section III, including the methods used to
build the regressions. Section IV will explain the results of the regressions, and the
study will conclude in Section V.
II. Literature Review
To demonstrate the validity of ARRA funding as a method to encourage
availability/adoption, I first analyze the factors that might affect a population’s
willingness or ability to adopt. Ford (2020) suggests two primary reasons why potential
customers may not adopt broadband services: lack of availability, and price versus
perceived relevance to the user. To reach the FCC’s 25 Mbps/3 Mbps benchmark,
internet service providers (ISPs) face the immense cost of installing infrastructure such
as fiber optic cable, which USTelecom reported to average around $27,000 per mile in
2017 (Aman, 2017). For urban areas, it is often easy for an ISP to justify covering the
entire census block (i.e. the narrowest level at which coverage is reported); urban
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blocks may indeed cover only a mile or two, and dense populations can make the
investment quickly profitable. However, in sparsely populated rural areas, ISPs have
little incentive to install hundreds of miles of cable to cover the widely-dispersed houses
across a census block. And perhaps more importantly, census blocks can be
considered “covered” if ISPs provide services to only one house in the block – and
coverage means less competition. After all, in order to attract customers, ISPs in a
competitive environment must incentivize their customers to choose their services over
the competition’s, either through lowering prices and/or providing higher quality
services. To bypass the lower cost/higher quality requirement, then, ISPs often only
provide coverage to a few houses in a block to “cover” the census block and ward off
potential competition. However, this mischaracterization ultimately leaves massive rural
populations in the “last mile” without broadband access. Therefore, because of a lack of
availability, rural broadband adoption rates are relatively low compared to urban areas.
And because broadband is now a necessity rather than a luxury, yet is not sufficiently
allocated by the private sector, this issue reveals a market failure that necessitates
some form of public funding to alleviate.
This lack of availability in rural and minority populations has led to the creation of
broadband monopolies, where the lack of competition means that consumers have
fewer choices regarding Internet services: cost, quality, customization, etc. The Institute
for Local Self-Reliance (ISLR) details this in a 2018 study, finding that “when it comes to
ISPs, subscribers often have a faux choice between unequal services, such as one
telephone company offering slow DSL and one cable company that offers faster cable
Internet access. People in rural America often have even fewer options because cable
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ISPs do not provide broadband in less populated rural areas” (Trostle & Mitchell, 2018,
para. 3). Monopolies, by definition, have no competition to regulate prices; and as the
demand for broadband services increases, monopolies can charge high prices that may
leave a lot of underserved, price-sensitive populations behind. If these populations do
not perceive broadband as particularly relevant in their daily lives – which may often be
the case in rural and underserved areas, where broadband/computer education is low –
and services are provided at unattainable prices, broadband adoption rates will remain
at uninspiring levels for affected communities (Ford, 2020).
Other researchers echo this analysis, with several additions to the discussion.
The 2012 FCC report covered various reasons for the then-lackluster 40% adoption of
Americans able to adopt benchmark services, including “lack of affordability, lack of
digital literacy, and a perception that the Internet is not relevant or useful to them” (FCC,
2012, p. 5). Also, the 2015 Current Population Survey (CPS) Computer and Internet
Use Supplement cited “Don’t Need It/Not Interested” as the primary reason for nonadoption (55.2%), followed by “Too Expensive” (23.5%) and “No Computer” (7.3%),
which supports the cruciality of price and relevance for adoption rates (U.S. Census
Bureau, 2015). Additional context may be found in the research of Horrigan and
Satterwhite (2010), who conclude that, alongside infrastructure and innovation, social
support for users is vital to increased broadband adoption. The authors define social
support as “the ‘demonstration effect’ that comes when people see others in their social
networks using something new, which in turns helps people understand the value of
trying something new” (Horrigan & Satterwhite, 2010, p. 2). This suggests that areas
with few broadband education programs and low perceived importance of broadband
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will likely have low levels of adoption as well. This suggestion is supported by Prieger
(2015) and Gant et al. (2010), who explain that the historic gaps in economic
opportunity for US minorities have contributed to a lack of digital inclusion – and
therefore a lack of social support – for fixed broadband access, which may explain the
large gaps in fixed broadband adoption between whites and minorities. (It is important to
note that this does not necessarily apply to mobile broadband services, however.)
It seems, then, that broadband funding directed toward concerns of price,
relevance, social support, and broadband literacy/education would have a significant
effect on broadband adoption rates. Ford does explain in a 2020 study that past
broadband subsidies may have played a role in encouraging price-sensitive customers
to adopt, alluding to the idea that state aid may effectively address the price factor of
adoption. Belloc et al. (2012) also confirm this idea, finding both a positive and
significant impact of demand- and supply-side investment on broadband penetration
when policies target underserved areas. (Though it is important to note that only
demand-side policies led to significant penetration in areas where broadband diffusion
was in an advanced stage.) Another study conducted in the German state of Bavaria
concludes that aid targeting underserved rural areas contributed to an 16.8-23.2%
increase in broadband coverage depending on the resulting infrastructures’ speed
(Briglauer et al., 2016). However, while closing the “digital divide” between Bavarian
rural and urban areas was an oft-used target by state funding efforts, the researchers
found that the increases in broadband coverage did not significantly affect rural
economic growth.

8
ARRA itself has received mixed reviews on its effectiveness. On one hand, its
goals with the SBI, BTOP, and BIP grants all seem to point toward addressing the most
important obstacles of broadband adoption. For example, by providing $293 million
dollars to the SBI for improved transparency through broadband mapping, ARRA should
have hypothetically curbed ISPs’ monopoly power. Coverage information is now publicly
available with more accurate data for potential public or private investors. This
transparency should have paved the way for more competition, and because more
competition leads to lower prices and more choices for consumers, one might suspect
that ARRA funding would increase broadband adoption. As another example, BTOP
was designed to catalyze adoption through its various projects: 123 grants for
infrastructure, 66 grants for creation/expansion of public computer centers, and 44
grants for general sustainable broadband adoption (Kruger, 2015). Through the
multifaceted funding of various availability/adoption factors (i.e. price reduction,
relevance boosting, infrastructure provision, etc.), one might expect BTOP funding to
play a significant role in broadband adoption. Jayakar and Park (2012) echo this idea by
discussing the components of successful public computer center grants, praising
BTOP’s requirement of technical feasibility and community accessibility estimations for
all grant applicants, which forces applicants to specify how the funding will directly
address adoption components like availability, price, etc.
However, in their aforementioned study, Jayakar and Park (2012) also found that
demand, more than supply, influences one’s willingness to adopt broadband services;
and BTOP is primarily a supply-side investment with few demand-side specifications.
This led the researchers to conclude that BTOP may not have been a wholly efficient
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distribution of funds. Other studies have also found that the altruistic theory behind
ARRA may not have necessarily led to its hoped-for outcomes in practice. In 2013, the
same researchers found that BTOP, contrary to its intended purpose, was realistically
allocated to areas that were not underserved and already had high broadband
penetration. Additionally, Hauge and Prieger (2015), after an intensive econometric
study, found that the effect of BTOP spending was relatively weak. “With such a high
degree of uncertainty in the results, no sweeping claims can be made for the success of
BTOP as regards the goal of sustainable adoption… Merely spending large amounts of
money does not guarantee measurable gain in broadband adoption” (p. 27). Regarding

broadband mapping, while transparency is a key for the prevention of monopolies, the
world of telecom has long realized that the SBI-funded broadband mapping is
misleading at best (Ford, 2019; Mack, 2019). As mentioned before, because broadband
is only reported on the census block level using ISPs’ self-reports (i.e. “Form 477”),
many underserved households are being mischaracterized as “covered” – a
mischaracterization that could be as high as 38% of households in some rural areas
(Taglang, 2020). Therefore, the $293 million dollars granted to transparency through
broadband mapping could, in the opinions of some, support the sustainment of
monopolies rather than their dissolution (Mitchell, 2010). If these monopoly-like
industries persist, they may encourage higher prices, less competition, and a larger
divide between underserved and adequately served populations.
Between both positive and negative critiques of ARRA and general public
broadband aid, there is a need to continue deciphering the overall effect of broadband
financing if legislators and investors are to continue investing in broadband
infrastructure. While a large body of literature exists covering various aspects of ARRA
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broadband – focuses on BTOP, rural funding, racial/ethnic gaps, etc. – there remains
little research on the holistic impact of ARRA funding between states. Therefore,
between the economic transformation awaiting life after COVID-19 and the
aforementioned gaps in research, this project stands to add valuable insight to the
existing literature.
III. Data and Methodology
The research question explored in this paper is as follows: Is there a causal
relationship between a state’s ARRA award and its change in 25 Mbps/3 Mbps
broadband availability/adoption in the years 2013 and 2016? This question, though
seemingly a simple one, explores ARRA funding from a variety of angles. For example,
while one question, it actually examines four different subparts: (a) the effect of ARRA
funding on benchmark broadband availability in 2013, (b) the effect of ARRA funding on
availability in 2016, (c) the effect of ARRA funding on adoption in 2013, and (d) the
effect of ARRA funding on adoption in 2016. The multidimensional examination of these
subparts allows for more robust conclusions; if trends move in the same direction when
comparing the subparts, then our analysis should possess additional evidence in
support of its accuracy – and vice versa if this is not the case. Also, this question
explores ARRA-funded projects in their most important stages of development:
inception (i.e. 2010), construction (i.e., 2013), and completion (i.e. 2016). Though this
study is a cross-sectional study, the research question itself explores data in a
chronological way. By examining years throughout the ARRA projects’ progress, we can
explore the speed at which availability and adoption increased from the outset of the
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program and determine if time is also a factor in any possible significance of ARRA
funding.
To start the process, data corresponding to the treatment variable – the natural
logarithm of grants and loans awarded during ARRA funding – was found. The data
used to measure these grants and loans originates from the NTIA’s 2010 report, and
was sourced from Kruger’s Background and Issues for Congressional Oversight of
ARRA Broadband Awards (2015). It is worth noting that these grants and loans –
expressed in millions of dollars in Kruger’s (2015) dataset – were allocated differently
according to the program from which they were granted. BTOP, the subsidiary of NTIA,
solely awarded grants as a part of its program, meaning awardees were not required to
pay back monies to NTIA after its award had been allocated. On the other hand, BIP
could be allocated in the form of grants, loans, or grant/loan combinations, which
required the loan awardees to pay back either a portion or the full amount of the loan
(plus interest) once the project had been completed. Though perhaps not explicit, one
potential effect of BIP loans on broadband availability/adoption could be the difficulty of
paying back loans during the aftermath of the Great Recession. One such example is
the Lake County Fiber Network in Lake County, MN, whose project was suspended due
to financial instability and likelihood of default (Kruger, 2015). If a state received more
loan money relative to grant money, then there could be a higher chance that the
project was not completed due to financial instability, which could play a small role in
the state’s availability/adoption in later years. Still, because it is fairly implicit, this effect
will simply be included in the error term.
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For the dependent variables, I examined the change in broadband
adoption/availability rates per state from 2010 to 2013, then 2010 to 2016. To start, data
from SBI’s September 2011 National Broadband Map Dataset were used for the 2010
benchmark broadband availability/adoption (State Broadband Initiative [SBI], 2011).
According to the FCC (2015), “The SBI data provide information for each census block
about each broadband provider’s advertised ability to deliver broadband services. The
SBI data identify the maximum speed a provider asserts that it can deliver, if requested,
within a typical service interval” (p. 38). Interestingly, the maximum-advertised download
speed by any state in 2010, according to the SBI’s national datasets, was 11 Mbps,
which does not come close to meeting today’s 25 Mbps benchmark. Therefore, for both
availability and adoption of 25 Mbps/3 Mbps in 2010, all states’ 2010 rates were set to
0%, as no provider in no census block in no state had reached the required 25 Mbps
download speed. Next, the availability/adoption rates for 2013 and 2016 were extracted
from the FCC’s 2015 Broadband Progress Report and 2018 Broadband Progress
Report, respectively. (Note the lag in data collection, as the 2015 report’s most current
data is from 2013. The same applies for the 2018 Broadband Progress Report’s current
data from 2016.) Broadband availability data originates from SBI national datasets in
December 2013; and while earlier data is used from SBI in the progress report, the
2018 report uses Form 477 data to measure 2016 broadband availability (SBI, 2014;
FCC, 2016). Form 477 data is collected by the FCC, and is the standardized, mandatory
form for ISPs to self-report the range and quality of their broadband services per census
block. As previously discussed, Form 477 data is not celebrated as being particularly
accurate and is widely known to overstate broadband coverage across the US,
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especially in rural areas. However, as this is the most standardized form of broadband
coverage data available, Form 477 is still the most reliable data for research.
Broadband adoption data for both 2013 and 2016 also originate from Form 477 data,
and are sourced from the FCC’s 2015 and 2018 broadband reports, respectively (FCC,
2013; FCC, 2016).
One may note that the National Broadband Map provides more granular data
than the regression in this study covers. Still, while more narrow data – even down to
the census block – is available for the dependent variables, the most granular, publiclyavailable data for ARRA funding (i.e. the treatment variable) is at the state level, which
is why I make state-by-state comparisons instead of county-by-county or block-by-block.
In the future, this project may be improved upon by requesting permission from the
NTIA and USDA, if possible, for more miniscule funding data regarding ARRA funding
divisions.
To prevent omitted variable bias, controls were added to the regressions as well.
As for availability, the primary influence on broadband coverage outside of ARRA
funding is, in fact, other funding from the private and public sector. While ARRA
represents a major portion of funding from 2010-2016, it was by no means the only
source, and those other sources may have played a role in changing broadband
coverage from 2010 to 2013 and 2016. For example, in the later years of the ARRA
construction period, projects like 2014’s $3.75 billion Connect America Fund (CAF)
were also awarded to promote broadband deployment (U.S. Department of Commerce
[DOC], 2015). However, partly due to time constraints and partly due to very limited
access to the necessary data, the influences of these outside funding initiatives were
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not included in this study’s regression controls; they are instead included in the error
term. Part of this exclusion is justified by limiting availability/adoption data to 2010-2016,
when ARRA funding made up the vast majority of funding initiatives and CAF projects
were mostly still under construction, and thus unlikely to significantly influence
availability/adoption rates. Still, excluding outside funding may contribute to some
omitted variable bias, and thus is another item for future improvement discussed further
in Section V.
To make up for this omission, I included other controls that may influence private
investment, the key to broadband availability. The first is median household income. As
discussed in Section II, states with a higher median household income have historically
attracted more broadband investment from the private sector because people with
higher incomes are able to pay higher prices. Additionally, as higher paying jobs are
now generally internet-dependent, states with higher median household incomes will
likely have a higher demand for high-speed internet access, which makes private
broadband investment even more lucrative. Due to this potential impact on broadband
availability, its effect is controlled using state-by-state median household income data
from the 2010 American Community Survey via the U.S. Census Bureau (2010a). Next,
I use the concentration of minorities and percentage of rural population. Traditionally,
rural and minority groups have been underserved in broadband coverage, as ISPs
invest where they know their investment will be profitable. As previously explained, the
fiber optic cable necessary for 25 Mbps/3 Mbps speeds costs more than $27,000 per
mile. For populations that are less likely to pay for the ISPs services and/or are widely
dispersed – where there are only a few potential subscribers per mile – ISPs are less
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likely to find their investment profitable, and may refrain from providing broadband
services to these areas. Therefore, to control for the potential negative effect of minority
and rural populations on private broadband investment (and therefore availability), I
include two variables: the state-by-state percentage of blacks from the 2010 American
Community Survey and the state-by-state percentage of rural populations from the 2010
U.S. Census (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010a; 2010b). Our final control is education.
Similar to the discussion for median household income, a higher level of education
attracts more advanced industries; as these industries often have a dependence on
broadband, education makes an area more lucrative for private broadband investment.
To control for education’s impact on broadband availability, I use two state-by-state
samples – the percentage of people with only a high school degree, and the percentage
of people with a graduate degree – from the 2010 American Community Survey (U.S.
Census Bureau, 2010a). I run two separate regressions for each question subpart,
divided between GED percentage and graduate degree percentage, for two reasons.
First, any attempt to include them in the same variable (i.e. the percentage of people
with a GED or higher) was met with multicollinearity issues, and thus required more
narrow data. Multicollinearity is shown in Figures 1 and 2. Second, the two variables
explore somewhat separate effects; a relatively high percentage of GED-only residents
may lead to relatively lower broadband investment, while a relatively high percentage of
graduate degree recipients may lead to the opposite. Therefore, I found it prudent to
explore both effects separately.
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Figure 1. Multicollinearity of GED control.

Figure 2. Multicollinearity of graduate degree control.
Controls for the adoption regressions will use the same controls to the availability
regressions: the state’s median household income, percentage of black residents,
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percentage of rural residents, and education (GED and graduate degree). However,
whereas the controls for availability correspond with the potential behavior of investors,
the controls for adoption correspond with the potential behavior of consumers. The main
influences that may have impacted adoption in 2010, covered in Section II, were
relevance, price, social support, literacy/education, and concentration of underserved
populations (rural and minority). Median household income covers the majority of these
factors. A highly-paid worker likely sees broadband as both relevant and affordable, and
will have the resources and social support to ease the adoption process, making him or
her more likely to adopt. States, then, with higher median household incomes may
experience higher adoption rates independent of ARRA funding, necessitating a control.
Next, minorities and rural populations often must pay unfeasible prices for broadband,
and because broadband is often not widely available due to insufficient private
investment, they often do not have the resources or social support that boost
subscribership. Therefore, relatively higher percentages of these groups compared to
other states could stymie broadband adoption, which also necessitates a control.
Finally, states with high percentages of GED-only residents likely have lower
literacy/education on broadband services and may have many residents who see
broadband adoption as unnecessary; the opposite is true for states with a large
graduate-degree population. As these populations may have influenced adoption in
years following ARRA, I included separate education controls for GED and graduate
degree percentages as I did for availability.
Table 1 shows a summary of descriptive characteristics for outcome measures,
the treatment variable, and control variables.
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Overall
(N=50)
ARRA Funding
Mean (SD)
Median [Min, Max]

146 (94.0)
141 [5.00, 444]

ARRA Funding (Log)
Mean (SD)
Median [Min, Max]

4.70 (0.880)
4.95 [1.61, 6.10]

25/3 Broadband Availability 2013 (Percent)
Mean (SD)
Median [Min, Max]

77.6 (19.5)
83.0 [13.0, 99.0]

25/3 Broadband Availability 2016 (Percent)
Mean (SD)
Median [Min, Max]

89.8 (6.77)
90.8 [72.3, 99.1]

25/3 Broadband Adoption 2013 (Percent)
Mean (SD)
Median [Min, Max]
Missing

28.9 (13.0)
29.0 [3.00, 52.0]
8 (16.0%)

25/3 Broadband Adoption 2016 (Percent)
Mean (SD)
Median [Min, Max]
Missing

51.5 (13.9)
50.9 [28.8, 81.7]
2 (4.0%)

Household Income
Mean (SD)
Median [Min, Max]

61300 (9630)
60500 [45500, 83100]

Household Income (Log)
Mean (SD)
Median [Min, Max]

11.0 (0.153)
11.0 [10.7, 11.3]

Black Population (Percent)
Mean (SD)
Median [Min, Max]
Rural Population (Percent)

10.3 (9.60)
7.00 [0.500, 37.3]
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Overall
(N=50)
Mean (SD)

28.0 (15.2)

Median [Min, Max]

27.0 [5.08, 67.0]

Population with GED ONLY (Percent)
Mean (SD)

29.7 (4.05)

Median [Min, Max]

29.6 [20.8, 41.6]

Population with Graduate Degree (Percent)
Mean (SD)

9.99 (2.47)

Median [Min, Max]

9.40 [6.30, 16.7]

Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
Let 1 denote the coefficient for log ARRA award amount awarded in state i,
where awards are in millions of dollars, and let 0 denote the intercept. Then, let yi
denote broadband availability rates, and let zi denote broadband adoption rates. Control
coefficients, all values in 2010, will be denoted as follows: 2 for the natural logarithm of
median household income, 3 for the percentage of black residents in a state’s
population, 4 for the percentage of rural residents in a state’s population, 5 for the
percentage of residents with only a GED, and 6 for percentage of residents with a
graduate degree. The error term is denoted by it. The following eight regressions will be
used for this thesis:
1. 2013, yi = 0 + 1log(ARRAi) + 2log(Incomei) + 3Blacki + 4Rurali + 5GEDi + i
2. 2013, yi = 0 + 1log(ARRAi) + 2log(Incomei) + 3Blacki + 4Rurali + 6Gradi + i
3. 2016, yi = 0 + 1log(ARRAi) + 2log(Incomei) + 3Blacki + 4Rurali + 5GEDi + i
4. 2016, yi = 0 + 1log(ARRAi) + 2log(Incomei) + 3Blacki + 4Rurali + 6Gradi + i
5. 2013, zi = 0 + 1log(ARRAi) + 2log(Incomei) + 3Blacki + 4Rurali + 5GEDi + i
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6. 2013, zi = 0 + 1log(ARRAi) + 2log(Incomei) + 3Blacki + 4Rurali + 6Gradi + i
7. 2016, zi = 0 + 1log(ARRAi) + 2log(Incomei) + 3Blacki + 4Rurali + 5GEDi + i
8. 2016, zi = 0 + 1log(ARRAi) + 2log(Incomei) + 3Blacki + 4Rurali + 6Gradi + i
IV. Results and Discussion
The results for the regressions above are displayed in Tables 2-6.

Table 2. Results from regressions 1 and 2.
First, Table 2 shows the results of regressions measuring the effect of ARRA
funding and various controls on broadband availability rates in 2013, separated by
controls for graduate and high school levels of education. For regressions 1 and 2, the
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coefficients achieving a p-value of less than 0.05 – the definition of “significant” used in
this study – were the natural logarithm of household income and the state’s percentage

Table 3. Results from regressions 3 and 4.
of rural population. In other words, the significant coefficients in, say, regression 2 first
show that a 10% increase in a state’s median household income correlates with around
a 3.4% increase in 25 Mbps/3 Mbps broadband availability in the state. Then, for every
1% more concentrated a state’s rural population is compared to other states, there is a
small but very significant decrease in availability of 0.8%. The same progression applies
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to regression 1 as well; however, because regression 2 suffers from less
multicollinearity issues than regressions 1 (due to the graduate school variable having
relatively higher correlation with other variables), more focus will be put on the results of
high-school-controlled regressions.
As for Table 3, the results of regressions measuring the effect of ARRA funding
and various controls on broadband availability rates in 2016 – when all ARRA projects
were completed – are displayed. For regression 4, the most significant effects on
broadband availability were again the natural logarithm of household income and the
state’s percentage of rural population. However, for regression 3 – controlling for
graduate degrees instead of high school degrees – only the percentage of a state’s rural
population had any significant impact on broadband availability (which, again, was a
negative effect). In regression 4, the significant coefficients first show that a 10%
increase in a state’s median household income leads to a 1.88% increase in broadband
availability in the state. Then, for every 1% relative increase in a state’s rural population,
there is again a slight but very significant decrease in availability of 0.24%.
Next, we turn from availability to adoption rates. Interestingly, when examining
Table 4, there is no significant coefficient on adoption in 2013 included in the
regression. This outcome may be partly due to time; at least where construction of
ARRA projects is concerned, it is possible that not enough time has passed for any
effect of ARRA on availability to be significant. However, time cannot necessarily
explain the insignificance of all these variables, and in fact, the coefficients from these
regressions only explain about 30% of the variation in broadband availability rates from
2010 to 2013. Compared to regression 7, where coefficients explain over 70% of the
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variation in 2016 broadband adoption, an R2 of 30% is not as suitable for reliable
analysis. As explained before, omitted variable bias could also be an explanation for this
discrepancy, especially regarding private broadband funding. However, given our
restraints in using private funding data, regressions 5 and 6 will simply be considered
non-explanatory for this study.

Table 4. Results from regressions 5 and 6.
Finally, in Table 5, we examine the results of regressions measuring the effect of
ARRA funding and various controls on broadband adoption rates in 2016. The only
significant effect captured in regression 8 – the high-school-controlled regression – was
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the natural logarithm of the median household income; for every 10% relative increase
in a state’s median household income, the state’s adoption rate increased by about 6%.
In regression 7, however, there are three significant coefficients, including the treatment
variable: ARRA funding. First, regarding the graduate school coefficient, a 1% relative
increase in a state’s percentage of graduate degree holders leads to a 2.15% increase

Table 5. Results from regressions 7 and 8.
in the state’s adoption rate. Then, for every 1% relative increase in a state’s rural
population, there is an unsurprising significant decrease in adoption of 0.20%. Most
surprising, however, is the coefficient of the ARRA funding variable. Discussed further
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below, a 10% in a state’s ARRA funding actually led to a significant decrease in
adoption of 0.322%, which is certainly counterintuitive to the goals of ARRA.
Before we examine the possible reasoning behind this occurrence, it is prudent
to acknowledge some other interesting phenomena from the resulting statistics. First,
one interesting result reinforced by multiple regressions is a highly significant decrease
in availability and adoption related to the presence of a higher rural population. Perhaps
this result should not be fully surprising. Before ARRA projects were completely finished
(i.e. 2013), it would make sense that urban states would have higher levels of
availability due to the lucrativeness of private broadband investment in highly-populated
areas; the higher the rural percentage, the lower the broadband availability. This idea is
shown in Figure 3. Yet as one might hope, ARRA funding seemed to have some effect
in levelling the playing field, at least for broadband availability. From 2010 to 2013, a 1%
increase in a state’s rural population percentage caused a 0.80% reduction in its relative
broadband availability. However, from 2010 to 2016, that number dropped to only a
0.24% decrease. While the optimal result would be 0% (i.e. a state’s rurality has no
effect on its broadband availability), the closing discrepancy between rural and urban
states’ availability is encouraging. However, due to the uncertain results of 2013, no
such comparison can be made for adoption, and should be expanded upon in further
studies.
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Figure 3. The effect of rural population on availability rates in 2013.
Most important to the discussion, however, is the effect of ARRA funding on the
dependent variables. There are two primary concerns that come from the outcomes in
Tables 2-6. The first is that, for all regressions except regression 7, the natural logarithm
of ARRA funding had no significant effect on availability nor adoption. For example,
according to Table 3, there is a 95% chance that a 10% increase in ARRA funding
caused anything from a 0.157% decrease to a 0.163% increase in 2016 broadband
availability. Said differently, there is a 97.3% chance that the resulting coefficient of
0.03% was caused by something other than ARRA funding. Therefore, we cannot say
that funding played any important role in improving broadband availability or adoption.
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Why did this outcome occur? One reason may again be time constraints.
Regarding the 2013 regressions, many ARRA projects were not yet completed, and
some had not even broken ground. The resulting lag could explain why the vast majority
of changes in broadband availability/adoption between 2010 and 2013 were not due to
ARRA funding, but because of other forces already at work during the time period.
However, even in 2016 – when all projects were to be completed – ARRA
funding only had a significant effect in one regression…and it was negative. This is the
other concern from the outcomes of Tables 2-6. In regression 7, the coefficient for a
10% increase in a state’s ARRA award is -0.322%; therefore, if a state’s relative award
increases by 10%, their percentage of broadband adoption decreases by 0.322%. This
result may seem counterintuitive. After all, if a state receives funding for express
purpose of increasing broadband adoption, how could adoption decrease? The story
lies in the spread. Figure 4 shows the relationship between ARRA funding and adoption
rates in 2016. Notably, the top three highest and lowest adoption rates belonged to
states in the bottom 50% – below $140.24m – of award recipients:
1) New Jersey (81.7%, $49.7m)
2) Delaware (81.2%, $5m)
3) Massachusetts (79.1%, $94.5m)
48) Maine (30.2%, $42.6m)
49) Arkansas (29.3%, $128.5m)
50) Mississippi (28.8%, $127.3m)
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Figure 4. The relationship between ARRA funding and adoption rates in 2016.
Because the spread of adoption is so wide for lower amounts of funding, yet
there is less of a spread (and lower rates) at higher amounts, the coefficient is negative.
Still, one might question why the spread of adoption rates is so large among lower
amounts of funding, or perhaps even more importantly, why adoption rates were
consistently lower for states that received larger amounts of funding. For low amounts of
funding, the spread of adoption could be high for a variety of reasons. One is that, at
least on the high end of broadband adoption, the states that received the least amount
of funding should have been the ones who needed the least public assistance. This
matches the picture painted in the FCC’s 2015 Broadband Progress Report; the top
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three states for adoption rates already possessed the highest adoption rates for lower
broadband speeds (10 Mbps/1 Mbps, specifically), so they were less likely to be
classified as “underserved” and less likely to receive high amounts of ARRA funding.
Consequently, these states also happen to rank in the top ten for median household
income (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). Therefore, consistent with the findings of Horrigan
and Satterwhite (2010), these states likely offer an environment where broadband
adoption is not only supported by social networks, but also required by higher-paying,
internet-dependent industries. Their high spikes in adoption, then, are likely due to an
already-fertile environment for broadband adoption to occur rather than high amounts of
ARRA funding. In other words, these places did not need much incentive to adopt
broadband because they already have the income and support to do so, so even the
little investment they received caused a large increase in adoption. However, the
opposite is true for states on the lower end of the adoption spectrum. Arkansas and
Mississippi, the states with the lowest adoption rates, also ranked 49th and 50th for
household income in 2016. They were also among the 5 lowest adopters of 10 Mbps/1
Mbps broadband. Still, they received below-median amounts of ARRA funding, which
explains the large spread of adoption rates below the median funding amount. It does
not, however, explain why the struggling states did not get higher amounts of funding,
especially considering that ARRA was specifically designed to provide broadband
services in underserved and underequipped states. The fact that Arkansas and
Mississippi – the states with the lowest household incomes in 2016 – also received the
lowest amounts of ARRA funding should be a red flag for the effectiveness of ARRA
allocation, as ARRA was supposed to target underserved areas.
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Finally, the question of adoption for the upper half of awardees: Why did
broadband adoption become relatively lower as the amount of ARRA funding
increased? According to Figure 4, states receiving over $300m – Texas and Kentucky –
possessed some of the lowest adoption rates in 2016, perhaps providing evidence that
ARRA funding was wasted. (Note: California received the highest amount at $444.3m,
but is an outlier regarding adoption, and therefore not included in this discussion). Still,
one probable explanation matches the description above. The states that received the
highest amounts of funding, for good reason, were on the low end of household income
and 10/1 broadband adoption. However, because they were on the lower end of those
spectrums, they likely did not have the social support or literacy required to promote the
adoption of broadband initiatives, even if the funding played any role in promoting
infrastructure. The findings of Jayakar and Park (2013) offer additional insight in
explaining that ARRA was, in general, a supply-side initiative. It focused on building:
installing infrastructure, constructing computer centers, laying fiber. Yet according to
these authors and Belloc et al. (2012), the policies that significantly improve broadband
adoption rates are the ones that encourage residents to demand broadband, and ARRA
had few parameters that targeted demand. This idea is also supported by the data;
Texas was among the top 20 states in 2016 availability rates – meaning broadband
infrastructure made services available – yet had one of the lowest rates of adoption.
This means, then, that there are other factors besides availability (i.e. supply) that lead
to adoption. Because ARRA focused much less on those who would actually adopt the
provided services and more-so on the infrastructure itself, the states with infertile
broadband environments did not see dramatic increases in adoption. Therefore, the
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states that rightfully received higher amounts of ARRA funding – Texas and Kentucky –
were not as prepared to put it to good use because the environment was not fertile for
adoption; funding did not generally help residents understand or support broadband, so
high amounts of funding per state do appear to cause lower levels of adoption.
All in all, this study matches the literature in finding that, holistically, ARRA
funding did not have much significant effect on broadband adoption or availability. On
the positive note, it does seem that, generally, ARRA funding was allocated somewhat
consistently based on states’ needs. Those who had relatively high median household
incomes and high previous adoption of 10/1 broadband received relatively lower
amounts of funding, while states with low incomes and low adoption of 10/1 received
some of the highest amounts of funding in 2016. However, this optimistic allocation
does not apply to all states, as struggling states like Mississippi were in the bottom half
of awardees, while tech-leader California received a whopping $444.3m. While it would
be harsh to deem the program a waste of funding, policymakers undoubtedly must reexamine the priorities of future broadband investments by balancing both supply-side
and demand-side issues.
V. Conclusion
Broadband is no longer a luxury. As schools move online, jobs migrate from
offices to homes, and innovation depends on download speed, the economy is
becoming increasingly dependent on reliable broadband connection. Still, as
dependency increases and the world rapidly advances toward an online economy,
millions of U.S citizens still find themselves falling behind. The sheer importance of
programs like ARRA comes from a need not being met. Private ISPs have failed to
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provide broadband to those who are underserved, and this reality calls for public
investment to realize the vision with which ARRA was passed. This sentiment is
encapsulated in the FCC’s 2015 Broadband Progress Report by Chairman Tom
Wheeler, who was responsible for setting the current 25/3 benchmark:
“Are [broadband] services being ‘deployed to all Americans in a reasonable and
timely fashion?’ Simply put, no… In rural areas, more than half lack access to
broadband at the new benchmark; in Tribal lands, it’s almost two thirds that lack
access. The disparity persists at all speeds… Sadly, we wouldn’t be where we
need to be on broadband deployment to all Americans, even if we hadn’t
increased the benchmark speed… The FCC doesn’t just have a statutory
obligation to report on the status of broadband deployment; we have a duty to
take immediate action if we assess that the goal of deployment to all Americans
is not being met. And act we have… But we acknowledge that more efforts may
be needed” (p. 106-107).
To encourage additional broadband investment projects in the future, more
research must be completed to discover the best possible implementation methods.
This study can be continued and improved upon in multiple ways. First, a narrower look
at various states’ success with ARRA may reveal helpful patterns. For example, an indepth study of New Jersey’s ARRA projects may show why some states succeeded in
boosting availability and adoption, while others – even with large amounts of funding –
saw much lower increases in those rates. Another interesting study may be qualitative
case study on a small sample of ARRA projects. Homing in on a limited number of
projects – some very successful, some less-so – and determining the factors that
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contributed to their various levels of success may yield helpful results for policymakers,
and those results may show interesting patterns when extrapolated to a state- or nationwide context. Second, it may be the case – at least for broadband adoption – that there
is simply a longer lag for funding to take any effect. It would be prudent, then, to look at
years past 2016 to see if adoption does indeed increase with time. The reason this was
not done in this thesis was a lack of control data; in order to perform such a study,
researchers would need a state-by-state distribution of all other private and public
investment awarded during and after 2016 to isolate the effect of ARRA funding, which
was not readily available during the time of the study. Finally, this project may be
expanded upon by examining the effect of ARRA funding on lower speeds broadband
services. Admittedly, this project does not focus on the parameters that were
considered when ARRA was passed and funds were allocated; at that time, the goal
was to provide the 2010 benchmark levels of broadband, which were 200 Kbps/200
Kbps and eventually 4 Mbps/1 Mbps. Perhaps part of the reason for ARRA’s
insignificant effect is that, from the time of its passing to 2015, the benchmark for
broadband was 4 Mbps/1 Mbps, so much of the infrastructure being installed and
adopted did not meet the benchmark used for this study. Therefore, it would be prudent
to explore if ARRA funding played a significant role in improving the availability/adoption
rates of its original goal speeds.
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Appendix A: R Script File
# SETTING UP
setwd("C:/Users/Katie Waide/Desktop/KATIE/Education/4 - Senior - Spring/ECO 4
99/Thesis")
library(readxl)
library(dplyr)
library(stringr)
library(panelr)
library(tidyr)
library(table1)
library(sjPlot)
library(sjmisc)
library(sjlabelled)
# LOADING DATA
ARRA_Funding <- read_excel("ARRA_Funding.xlsx", na = "")
Availability_2013 <- read_excel("Broadband_Progress_Report_2013.xlsx", na = "
")
Availability_2016 <- read_excel("Broadband_Progress_Report_2016.xlsx", na = "
")
Adoption_2013 <- read_excel("Adoption_2013_Report.xlsx", na = "")
Adoption_2016 <- read_excel("Adoption_2016_Report.xlsx", na = "")
ACS_2010 <- read.csv("Census_ACS_2010_data.csv", na = "")
Ed_2010 <- read.csv("Census_Ed_2010_data.csv", na = "")
Income_2010 <- read.csv("Census_HHIncome_2010_data.csv", na = "")
RU_2010 <- read.csv("Census_RU_2010_data.csv", na = "")
# MANIPULATING DATA
# ARRA Funding
ARRA_Funding <- dplyr::select(ARRA_Funding, state, grants_loans)
# Availability 2013
Availability_2013 <- dplyr::select(Availability_2013, state,
allarea_noaccperc2013)
Availability_2013 <- mutate(Availability_2013, percavail_2013 = 100 - (allare
a_noaccperc2013 * 100))
Availability_2013 <- dplyr::select(Availability_2013, - allarea_noaccperc2013
)
# Availability 2016
Availability_2016 <- dplyr::select(Availability_2016, - pop_eval2016 &
- pop_accfixed2016 &
- pop_accLTE2016 &
- pop_accLTEperc2016 &
- pop_evalLTE10_2016 &
- pop_accLTE10_2016 &
- pop_accLTE10perc_2016)
Availability_2016 <- mutate(Availability_2016, percavail_2016 = (pop_accfixed
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perc2016 * 100))
Availability_2016 <- dplyr::select(Availability_2016, - pop_accfixedperc2016)
Availability_2016 <- filter(Availability_2016, state != "RuralAreas")
Availability_2016 <- filter(Availability_2016, state != "UrbanAreas")
# Adoption 2013
Adoption_2013 <- mutate(Adoption_2013, percadop_2013 = down25_up3)
Adoption_2013 <- dplyr::select(Adoption_2013, state, percadop_2013)
# Adoption 2016
Adoption_2016 <- mutate(Adoption_2016, percadop_2016 = down25_up3)
Adoption_2016 <- dplyr::select(Adoption_2016, state, percadop_2016)
# CONTROLS
# ACS
ACS_2010 <ACS_2010 <ACS_2010 <ACS_2010 <-

dplyr::select(ACS_2010, state, percblack_2010, perchisp_2010)
filter(ACS_2010, state != "DistrictofColumbia")
filter(ACS_2010, state != "PuertoRico")
filter(ACS_2010, state != "UnitedStates")

# Education
Ed_2010 <- dplyr::select(Ed_2010, state, pop_over25yr, midsch, hs, associate,
bachelor, graduatesch, perc_hsup, perc_bachup)
Ed_2010 <- filter(Ed_2010, state != "DistrictofColumbia")
Ed_2010 <- filter(Ed_2010, state != "PuertoRico")
Ed_2010 <- filter(Ed_2010, state != "UnitedStates")
# Household
Income_2010
Income_2010
Income_2010
Income_2010
# Rural
RU_2010
RU_2010
RU_2010
RU_2010
RU_2010
RU_2010
RU_2010

Income
<- dplyr::select(Income_2010, state, households, hh_income)
<- filter(Income_2010, state != "DistrictofColumbia")
<- filter(Income_2010, state != "PuertoRico")
<- filter(Income_2010, state != "UnitedStates")

and Urban
<- dplyr::select(RU_2010, state, urban, rural, pop)
<- filter(RU_2010, state != "DistrictofColumbia")
<- filter(RU_2010, state != "PuertoRico")
<- filter(RU_2010, state != "UnitedStates")
<- mutate(RU_2010, perc_rural = rural / pop)
<- mutate(RU_2010, perc_rural = perc_rural * 100)
<- dplyr::select(RU_2010, state, perc_rural)

# MERGING DATA
Availability <Availability <Availability <Availability <Availability <Availability <Availability <-

merge(ARRA_Funding, Availability_2013, by = "state")
merge(Availability, Availability_2016, by = "state")
mutate(Availability, percavail_2010 = 0)
mutate(Availability, percadop_2010 = 0)
merge(Availability, Adoption_2013, by = "state")
merge(Availability, Adoption_2016, by = "state")
merge(Availability, ACS_2010, by = "state")
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Availability
Availability
Availability
Availability
Availability

<<<<<-

merge(Availability, Ed_2010, by = "state")
merge(Availability, Income_2010, by = "state")
mutate(Availability, lhh_income = log(hh_income))
mutate(Availability, lgrants_loans = log(grants_loans))
merge(Availability, RU_2010, by = "state")

rm(ARRA_Funding)
rm(Availability_2013)
rm(Availability_2016)
rm(ACS_2010)
rm(Ed_2010)
rm(Income_2010)
rm(RU_2010)
rm(Adoption_2013)
rm(Adoption_2016)
# SETTING UP REGRESSIONS
Availability$diff_percavail_2013 <- Availability$percavail_2013
y$percavail_2010
Availability$diff_percavail_2016 <- Availability$percavail_2016
y$percavail_2010
Availability$diff_percadop_2013 <- Availability$percadop_2013 percadop_2010
Availability$diff_percadop_2016 <- Availability$percadop_2016 percadop_2010

- Availabilit
- Availabilit
Availability$
Availability$

# Regressions: Availability (2013)
avmodelgrad_2013 <- lm(diff_percavail_2013 ~ log(grants_loans) + log(hh_incom
e) + graduatesch + percblack_2010 + perc_rural, data = Availability)
avmodelhs_2013 <- lm(diff_percavail_2013 ~ log(grants_loans) + log(hh_income)
+ hs + percblack_2010 + perc_rural, data = Availability)
# Regressions: Availability (2016)
avmodelgrad_2016 <- lm(diff_percavail_2016 ~ log(grants_loans) + log(hh_incom
e) + graduatesch + percblack_2010 + perc_rural, data = Availability)
avmodelhs_2016 <- lm(diff_percavail_2016 ~ log(grants_loans) + log(hh_income)
+ hs + percblack_2010 + perc_rural, data = Availability)
# Regressions: Adoption (2013)
admodelgrad_2013 <- lm(diff_percadop_2013 ~ log(grants_loans) + log(hh_income
) + graduatesch + percblack_2010 + perc_rural, data = Availability)
admodelhs_2013 <- lm(diff_percadop_2013 ~ log(grants_loans) + log(hh_income)
+ hs + percblack_2010 + perc_rural, data = Availability)
# Regressions: Adoption (2016)
admodelgrad_2016 <- lm(diff_percadop_2016 ~ log(grants_loans) + log(hh_income
) + graduatesch + percblack_2010 + perc_rural, data = Availability)

42

admodelhs_2016 <- lm(diff_percadop_2016 ~ log(grants_loans) + log(hh_income)
+ hs + percblack_2010 + perc_rural, data = Availability)

